Judges Legal Precedents

Once a case has been decided, the same plaintiff cannot sue the same defendant again for a claim arising from the same facts. The law requires plaintiffs to ask all questions on the table in a single case and not divide the case. For example, in a car accident, the plaintiff cannot sue first for property damage and then for assault in a separate case. This is called res judicata or claim preclusion («res judicata» is the traditional name that dates back centuries; the name was changed to «claim preclusion» in the United States at the end of the 20th century). The exclusion of claims applies regardless of whether the plaintiff wins or loses the previous case, even if the last case raises a different legal theory, even the second claim is unknown at the time of the first case. The exceptions are extremely limited, for example: if the two actions for damages must necessarily be brought in different courts (for example, one action may be brought exclusively at the federal level and the other exclusively at the state level). Proponents of the primacy of precedent as a source of constitutional importance emphasize the legitimacy of decisions that respect the principles set out in previous and well-reasoned written opinions.13FootnoteBobbitt, op. cit. cit., note 2, p. 42.

They argue that compliance with the principle stare decisis14FootnoteStare decisis refers to the doctrine of case law, according to which a tribunal must follow previous judicial decisions when the same points recur in a dispute. Black`s Law Dictionary 1626 (10th edition 2014). and the adoption of decisions based on previous cases supports the Court`s role as a neutral, impartial and consistent decision-maker.15 See Gerhardt, op. cit. cit., note 4, pp. 70-71 (discussion of arguments in support of the use of precedents). The use of precedents in constitutional interpretation is intended to increase the predictability, consistency and stability of the law for judges, legislators, lawyers and political powers and institutions based on the decisions of the Court16FootnoteEpstein and Walker, op. cit. cit., note 3, p. 29; Gerhardt, op. cit.

cit., note 4, pp. 85-87. prevent the Court from setting aside all but the most misguided decisions,17Footnote Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. 723, 749-50 (1988); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. 570, 585 (2001). and allow constitutional norms to evolve slowly over time.18FootnoteGregory E. Maggs and Peter J. Smith, Constitutional Law: A Contemporary Approach 19 (3rd edition 2015). Originalism is an approach to interpreting a legal text in which a dominant weight is given to the intention of the original authors (at least the intention derived by a modern judge). In contrast, a non-originalist examines other indications of meaning, including the current meaning of words, the pattern and trend of other judicial decisions, the changing context and improvement of scientific understanding, observation of practical results and «what works,» contemporary judicial norms, and stare decisis.

Both are designed to interpret the text, not to change it – interpretation is the process of dissolving ambiguity and choosing among possible meanings, not changing the text. One of the most important tasks of the previous ones is to remove ambiguities in other legal texts such as constitutions, statutes and regulations. The process mainly involves consulting the plain language of the text, as clarified by the legislative history of the decree, subsequent precedents and experiences with different interpretations of similar texts. Stare decisis reduces the number and scope of legal issues that the court must resolve in a dispute. It is therefore a time saver for judges and litigants. Once a court clarifies a particular point of law, it has set a precedent. Thanks to stare decisis, claims can be rejected quickly and efficiently, as disputes can be resolved using rules and principles that have been established previously. Stare decisis can therefore encourage parties to settle cases amicably, thereby increasing the efficiency of the judicial system.

[30] The courts attempt to present the common law as a «homogeneous web» so that the principles of one area of law apply to other areas as well. However, this principle does not apply uniformly. Thus, a word may have different definitions in different areas of law or different rules apply, so a question has different answers in different legal contexts. Judges try to minimize these conflicts, but they occur from time to time and may persist for some time on the principle of «stare decisis.» In most cases, the Court of Justice bases its decisions on the logic of several precedents. One example is Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, which found that Arizona voters could strip the state legislature of the power to redraw district boundaries and delegate that power to an independent commission.8Footnote576 U.S. 787, 793–94 (2015). In doing so, the Court considered the election clause, which states that the times, places and manner of conducting elections for senators and representatives in each state are prescribed by the Legislative Assembly.9 Article 1, § 4, para. 1. The Court held that the term legislature includes voters of a state that legislates by referendum.10FootnoteAriz.

State Legislature, 576 U.S. to 824. In making this decision, the Court relied on three early twentieth-century decisions to support a broader view of the term legislature.11 p. 805 (Three decisions form the relevant case law: Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221 (1920); and Smiley v.

Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932)). including a 1916 case, Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, whom the court described as meaning that a state referendum was part of the legislative branch and could be exercised by the people to disapprove of legislation creating congressional districts.12FootnoteId. at 805 (citation omitted). With the June 24 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women`s Health Organization, which overturned the landmark 1973 abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, the doctrine of stare decisis has fueled debate about the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court is bound by precedent. Some argue that over-reliance on precedent can be problematic.

On the one hand, some precedents may have been ill-decided in which a case based on them merely continues its misinterpretation of the Constitution.19FootnoteRaoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 Ind. L.J. 723, 747 (1991) (citation omitted). Indeed, critics argue that if the Court sticks strictly to precedent once a precedent has been established on a question of constitutional law, the only way to alter that decision is to amend the Constitution.20Footnote, for example, Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., differing) (In cases concerning the Federal Constitution, where correction by legislative measures is practically impossible, the Court has often reversed its earlier decisions.); Schmidt v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) ([W]here the Tribunal was convinced of an earlier error, it never felt obliged to follow the precedents.