Legal Obligation Meaning in Law
Every legal system contains mandatory laws, but there is no decisive linguistic marker that determines what they are. It is not necessary to use the term «obligation» or its term almost synonymous with «duty». Mood is rarely found imperative. The Canadian Penal Code requires not condoning genocide: «Anyone who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of a criminal offence and may be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.» The English law on the sale of goods states: «If the seller sells goods in a transaction, there is an implied condition that the goods delivered under the contract are of merchantable quality.» The fact that these laws create obligations stems from the way the terms «offence» and «implied condition» operate in their respective jurisdictions, not from the language in which they are expressed. In the most technical definition, obligation refers to a sealed instrument. In Black`s Law Dictionary, the obligation is a moral or legal obligation to do or not to perform an action. Some jurists, including Fredrick Pollock, argue that obligation is another word for duty. The legal meaning of the obligation under ancient Roman law claims that obligations are the link of vinculum juris or legal necessity between at least two persons or parties. (3) `continuing undertaking` means the obligation currently enforceable; Some common uses of the term «obligation» in the legal sense are: 1.
«Contractual obligation» means the obligation to pay for or perform certain actions arising out of a contract or agreement Austin, John | Bentham, Jeremy | Stowaway problem| Law: and language| Nature of the right | Nature of Law: Interpretivist Theories | Nature of the law: legal positivism | Nature of Law: Pure Legal Theory None of these versions of sanctions theory has survived the criticism of H.L.A. Hart (Hart 1994, 27-42; cf. Hacker 1973). First, they misleadingly present a number of different legal consequences – including compensation and even disability – as if they all acted as sanctions. Second, they render incomprehensible many well-known references to duties in the absence of sanctions, such as the duty of the highest courts to enforce the law. Third, they provide an inadequate explanation of the non-optional nature. «You have a duty not to kill» cannot simply mean: «If you kill, you will be punished», because the law is not indifferent between people who, on the one hand, murder and are imprisoned and, on the other hand, do not kill at all. «The right not to obey the law cannot be obtained by paying a fine or a broadcasting fee» (Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] 2 All ER 408, p.
412). Such dictas are common and reflect familiar legal attitudes. More importantly, the normal function of sanctions in law is to strengthen tariffs, not to build them. It is true that one of the reasons why people are interested in knowing their legal obligations is to avoid sanctions, but this is not the only reason and, contrary to what Oliver Wendell Holmes suspected, a theoretically primary reason. Subjects also want to be guided by their duties – whether to fulfill them or intentionally violate them – and officials invoke them as reasons and not just as consequences of their decisions. The popular meaning of the term «obligation» is a duty to do or not to do something. In the legal sense, obligation is a civil law concept. An obligation may be voluntary, for example an obligation arising from a contract, a quasi-contract, a unilateral promise.
An obligation can also be created unintentionally, such as a tort liability obligation or a statute (for example, California Uniform Interstate Family Support Act). An obligation binds two or more specific persons. Therefore, the legal meaning of an obligation refers not only to an obligation, but also to a correlative right – one party has an obligation, means that another party has a corresponding right. The person or entity responsible for the obligation is referred to as the debtor; The natural or legal person who has the right corresponding to an obligation is called a creditor. In contrast, Dworkin believes that we generally have «a duty to fulfill our responsibilities under social practices that define groups and assign special responsibilities to members» (Dworkin 1986, 198), provided that group members believe that their obligations are special and personal, and result from a proper interpretation of the same concern for the well-being of all its members. In truth, however, these conditions are not a matter of the members` actual feelings and thoughts—they are interpretive qualities that we should attribute to them (201).